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FOREIGN SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY: WHEN
Is A SOVEREIGN REALLY
A SOVEREIGN?
Shawn C. Hunt*
N 2003, the U.S. Supreme Court ruling in Dole v. Patrickson resolved
conflicts among the various courts of appeals involving the applicabil-
ity of the Foreign Sovereign Immunity Act (FSIA) to entities re-
motely owned by foreign state governments.1 In its decision issued April
22, 2003, the Supreme Court answered two technical, yet highly signifi-
cant, questions and narrowed the scope of what constitutes a foreign sov-
ereign under the FSIA.2 The Supreme Court decision affects litigation
involving foreign entities, including decisions made by lawyers in bringing
these actions, as well as decisions made by foreign entities in anticipating
a defense.
The U.S. Supreme Court answered the following questions: 1) is a cor-
poration an "agency or instrumentality" if a foreign state owns the major-
ity of the shares of a corporate enterprise that in turn owned a majority of
the shares of the corporation; and 2) does the foreign state have to own
the majority of the shares of the corporation at the time of the events
giving rise to the litigation or at the time the plaintiff commences a suit
against the corporation in order to be eligible for immunities under
FSIA?3
I. LEGAL AND FACTUAL BACKGROUND LEADING TO
SUPREME COURT DECISION
Understanding the ramifications of the Supreme Court ruling on these
issues requires a basic understanding of the FSIA, the relevant provisions
that form the basis of the Supreme Court decision in Dole v. Patrickson,
and the events and conflicting decisions leading to the grant of certiorari
by the Supreme Court. FSIA governs whether foreign entities are enti-
tled to immunity from suit and jurisdiction in U.S. courts.4 The statute
* J.D. Candidate, 2005, Southern Methodist University Dedman School of Law
1. Dole v. Patrickson, 123 S. Ct. 1655 (2003); 28 U.S.C. §§ 1602-1611 (1994).
2. Carlos M. Vasquez, New Supreme Court Terms Includes Issues of Foreign Sover-
eign Immunity (Addendum May 2003), at http://www.asil.org/insights/insigh91.htm.
3. Dole, 123 S. Ct. at 1655.
4. White and Case LLP, Supreme Court Decision Modifies Applicability of Foreign
Sovereign Immunities Act as to State Owned Companies (June 3, 2003), at http://
www.whitecase.com [hereinafter White and Case LLP].
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states that a foreign sovereign is immune from the jurisdiction of the U.S.
courts unless it comes under an enumerated exception.5 28 U.S.C. § 1603
defines a "foreign state" as including a "political subdivision of a foreign
state or an agency of instrumentality of a foreign state."'6
"Agency" or "instrumentality" of a foreign state means any entity 1)
which is a separate legal person, corporate or otherwise, and 2) which is
an organ of a foreign state or political subdivision thereof, or a majority
of whose shares or other ownership interest is owned by a foreign state or
political subdivision thereof, and 3) which is neither a citizen of a State of
the United States nor created under the laws of any third country.7
Even if foreign sovereigns or their agencies or instrumentalities do
not meet the requirements of immunity they are entitled to have actions
litigated in federal court. 8 Requirements of 28 U.S.C. § 1441 provide in
pertinent part:
(a) Except as otherwise expressly provided by Act of Congress, any
civil action brought in a State court of which the district courts of the
United States have original jurisdiction, may be removed by the de-
fendant or defendants, to the district court of the United States for
the district and division embracing the place where such action is
pending....
(d) Any civil action brought in a State Court against a foreign state
as defined in section 1603(a) of this title may be removed by the
foreign state to the district court of the United States for the district
and division embracing the place where such action is pending.9
The facts in Patrickson v. Dole, the Ninth Circuit case that was af-
firmed in part by the Supreme Court, are almost identical to the facts in a
Fifth Circuit case, Delgado v. Shell Oil.10 In both cases, foreign agricul-
tural workers from Costa Rica, Ecuador, Guatemala, and Panama filed
products liability actions in state courts, seeking damages for injuries sus-
tained while working on banana farms in foreign countries. 1 The injuries
stemmed from exposure to dibromochloropropane (DBCP), an agricul-
tural pesticide manufactured and designed in the United States and found
to cause sterility and cancer in those exposed. 12 Defendants in both ac-
tions are alleged to have designed, manufactured, sold, or used DBCP. 13
In Patrickson and Delgado, plaintiffs brought only state law causes of ac-
tion against U.S. defendants, including Dole Food Company and others,
for the use of DBCP, which was earlier banned from use in the United
5. 28 U.S.C. § 1604; David Zaslowsky, Corporations as Foreign Sovereigns: To Be or
Not to Be? 228 N.Y.L.J. 4 (2002).
6. 28 U.S.C. § 1603(a).
7. 28 U.S.C. § 1603(b)(I)-(2).
8. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a),(d).
9. Id.
10. Delgado v. Shell Oil Co., 231 F.3d 165 (5th Cir. 2000); Patrickson v. Dole Food
Co., 251 F.3d 795 (9th Cir. 2001).
11. Delgado, 231 F.3d at 165; Patrickson, 251 F.3d at 795.
12. Delgado, 231 F.3d at 165; Patrickson, 251 F.3d at 795.
13. Delgado, 231 F.3d at 169; Patrickson, 251 F.3d at 798.
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States by the Environmental Protection Agency.1 4 The defendants con-
tinued to sell the pesticide for use in foreign countries where workers
were not warned of its effects and often did not wear protective gear
when using it.15
In Delgado, unable to remove the cases on any federal question basis,
defendants impleaded Dead Sea Bromine Company, Ltd. (Dead Sea)
who they asserted was a "foreign state" within the meaning of FSIA. 16
Dead Sea was a second-tier subsidiary of a company owned by the State
of Israel.1 7 Dead Sea promptly claimed immunity under FSIA and re-
moved the entire case to federal court, a tactical move alleged by plain-
tiffs to be orchestrated by the defendants to land in federal court.18
In an attempt to remand the action back to state court, Delgado plain-
tiffs alleged that defendants fraudulently impleaded Dead Sea as a proce-
dural weapon.19 The U.S. District Court for the Southern District of
Texas ruled that Dead Sea qualified as a "foreign state" under FSIA and,
as such, its presence conferred subject matter jurisdiction over the entire
action.20 Under the FSIA, once an entity is classified as a foreign state,
the entity is presumed to be immune from the jurisdiction of U.S.
courts. 21 Unless a specified exception applies, a federal court lacks sub-
ject matter jurisdiction over a claim against a foreign state. 22 Unlike the
normal foreign state defendant, Dead Sea was allegedly actively cooper-
ating with the respondents who were ostensibly suing it, and so it waived
its immunity, thus strengthening the defendants' arguments for federal
subject matter jurisdiction. 23 The case was subsequently dismissed under
the doctrine of forum non conveniens. 24
On October 19, 2000, the Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court's deci-
sion in Delgado. The Court of Appeals held that indirect state ownership
suffices for "foreign state" status under FSIA, entitling defendants to re-
move actions to federal court. 25 The Fifth Circuit stated that the plain
language of the statute simply requires "ownership" by a foreign state. 26
14. Patrickson, 251 F.3d at 798.
15. Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act: Supreme Court Says Banana Workers' Suit Be-
longs in State Court, 21 No. 5 ANDREWS Toxic CHEMICALS LITIG. REP. 3 (2003)
[hereinafter ANDREWS Toxic REP.]; see also Ann Pickering, Banana Workers and
DBCP, MEDILL NEWS SERVICE (Aug. 2002), available at http://
journalism.medill.northwestern.edu
16. Delgado, 231 F.3d at 169.
17. Id. at 175.
18. Id. at 174.
19. Id. at 174.
20. Id. at 175.
21. 28 U.S.C. § 1604(a).
22. Saudi Arabia v. Nelson, 507 U.S. 349, 355 (1993).
23. Delgado, 231 F.3d at 177. For a general discussion of fraudulent joinder and its
effects on FSI, see J. Thompson Thornton & Aurora A. Ares, The Foreign Sover-
eign Immunities Act of 1976: Misjoinder, Nonjoinder and Collusive Joinder, 58 J.
AIR L. & COM. 703 (1993).
24. Delgado, 231 F.3d at 165.
25. Id. at 176.
26. Id.
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"It draws no distinction between direct and indirect ownership; neither
does it expressly impose a requirement of direct ownership. '2 7 The Fifth
Circuit stated, "should any doubt remain concerning this Circuit's posi-
tion on tiering or indirect ownership, we squarely hold today that indirect
or tiered majority ownership is sufficient to qualify an entity as a foreign
state, assuming that all other requirements are met."'28
The Fifth Circuit acknowledged that its ruling was consistent with the
Seventh and Sixth Circuits, but not the Ninth Circuit.29 In fact, the ruling
directly conflicted with the Ninth Circuit holding that only direct owner-
ship is permitted by 28 U.S.C.§1603(b). 30 In Gates v. Victor Fine Foods,
the court held that the entity was " wholly owned by an agency or instru-
mentality of a foreign state" but not owned by a foreign state or political
subdivision thereof as required by the statute. 31
In Patrickson, one of the defendants, Dole Food Company, responded
to the class action brought in Hawaii state court by impleading the same
Israel chemical company as it did in Delgado, Dead Sea, which manufac-
tured some of the DBCP used in the plaintiffs' countries. 32 Dead Sea
claimed to be an instrumentality of the foreign state of Israel as defined
by FSIA, entitling it to removal under 28 U.S.C § 1441(d). 33 In May
2001, the Ninth Circuit disagreed, finding that Dead Sea was not an in-
strumentality of Israel under FSIA.34 Thus, removal was improper. This
ruling effectively barred defendant Dole Food's access to a federal
forum.3
5
II. THE SUPREME COURT GRANTS CERTIORARI IN DOLE
V. PATRICKSON TO RESOLVE CONFLICTS
Here, two circuits hearing cases involving the same defendants and
third party defendant under the same facts reached entirely different re-
sults. The Fifth Circuit held that Dead Sea was a foreign state qualifying
for immunity while the Ninth Circuit held that it was not. In the Ninth
Circuit, second-tier entities were not entitled to sovereign immunity and
the term "foreign state," as used in 28 U.S.C. § 1603(b), was limited to
the state itself so that a majority of shares in the instrumentality must be
owned by the foreign state or a political subdivision.36
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 176 (citing Gates v. Victor Fine Foods, 54 F.3d 1457, 1462 (9th Cir.1995).
30. Gates v. Victor Fine Foods, 54 F.3d 1457, 1462 (9th Cir. 1995).
31. Id.
32. ANDREWS Toxic REP., supra note 15, at 3.
33. Patrickson v. Dole Food Co., 251 F.3d 795, 798 (9th Cir. 2001).
34. Id. at 808.
35. Lumen N. Mulligan, No Longer Safe at Home: Preventing the Misuse of Federal
Common Law of Foreign Relations as a Defense Tactic in Private Transnational
Litigation, 100 Mic-. L. REV. 2408, 2421 (2002).
36. Dennis Quick, Local Law Firm Gives Foreign Workers a Chance for Justice,
CHARLESTON REG'L. Bus. J., June 19, 2003, available at http://www.crbj.com; see
also, Thad T. Dameris & Michael Muchetti, Vectors to Federal Court: Unique Ap-
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Direct conflict among the circuit courts as to what constitutes an agent
or instrumentality of a foreign sovereign set the stage for clarification by
the Supreme Court. In some U.S. courts, foreign entities were entitled to
rights and protections under the FSIA while in others they were treated
in the same manner as any other foreign corporation. 37 A need arose for
authoritative construction to resolve the issue uniformly throughout the
nation.
The Supreme Court granted certiorari on the Ninth Circuit case, Dole
v. Patrickson, where defendants claimed that the circuit erred in finding
that Dead Sea was not a foreign state for purposes of the FSIA, thus
disallowing removal to federal court. 38 The Supreme Court disagreed
with Dole, finding that Dead Sea was not an instrumentality of Israel at
the time of the filing of the complaint, because any relationship recog-
nized under FSIA between Dead Sea and Israel had been severed before
suit was commenced. 39 The Court also held that instrumentality status is
determined at the time of the filing of the complaint.40 In arriving at this
conclusion, the court construed 28 U.S.C. § 1603(b)(2) so that the present
tense in the provision "a majority of whose shares . . . is owned by a
foreign state" follows the plain meaning of the text of the provision,
which is expressed in the present tense. 41
The Supreme Court also held that a foreign state must own a majority
of shares of a corporation if the corporation is to be deemed an instru-
mentality of the state under the definition of agency or instrumentality in
the FSIA.42 Dead Sea was an indirect subsidiary of Israel and thus could
not come within the statutory language granting instrumentality status to
an entity a "majority of whose shares or other ownership interest is
owned by the foreign state of political subdivision thereof. ' 43 The Court
referenced basic principles of corporate law, specifically, that a corpora-
tion and its shareholders are distinct entities. An individual shareholder
does not own corporate assets and thus does not own any subsidiary cor-
porations that may be owned by the corporation.44 The Supreme Court
focused on "ownership" rather than control by holding that "majority
ownership by a foreign state, not control, is the benchmark of instrumen-
tality status. '45 Israel did not own a majority of shares in Dead Sea.46
proaches to Subject Matter Jurisdiction in Aviation Cases, 62 J. AIR L. & COM. 959
(1997).
37. Zaslowsky, supra note 5; see also In re Air Crash Disaster Near Roselawn Indiana,
96 F.3d 932, 941 (7th Cir. 1996) (defining foreign state broadly to include political
subdivisions as agencies or instrumentalities).
38. Dole v. Patrickson, 123 S. Ct. 1655 (2003).
39. Id.
40. Id. at 1655.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 1657.
43. Id. (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1603(b)(2)(2003)).
44. Id. at 1660.
45. Id. at 1662; see also Ann Pickering, On the Docket, available at http://journal-
ism.medill.northwestern.edu (last visited Oct. 7, 2003).
46. Dole, 123 S. Ct. at 1660.
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The Court distinguished official immunity in common law, which is given
to prevent the threat of suit from crippling the proper and effective ad-
ministration of public affairs, from the FSIA, which is not meant to avoid
chilling foreign states or their instrumentalities in the conduct of their
business, but to give them some protection from the inconvenience of suit
as a gesture of comity between the United States and other sovereigns. 47
III. EFFECTS OF DOLE V. PATRICKSON RULING ON
PENDING AND FUTURE LITIGATION
Thus, the U.S. Supreme Court's decision solved the conflicts and re-
solved technicalities involving the timing and constitution of instrumen-
talities of foreign states. What effect will this have on pending litigation
in lower courts involving foreign entities? Guidance can perhaps be
found in Borja v. Dole Food Company, a case dealing with this very is-
sue.48 In Borja, another case involving foreign banana workers exposed
to DBCP, defendants again impleaded Dead Sea and the action was re-
moved to federal court. There, plaintiffs' Motion to Remand was denied
and the case was conditionally dismissed on the grounds of forum non
conveniens, relying on the Fifth Circuit opinion in Delgado v. Shell Oil
Co. 49 After the Supreme Court's decision in Dole v. Patrickson, the U.S.
District Court for the Northern District of Texas determined that the
court can alter or amend a final judgment under Fed.R.Civ. P. 59(3) on a
number of grounds, including an intervening change in law, the availabil-
ity of new evidence not previously available, and the need to correct a
clear error of law or prevent manifest injustice.50 The district court deter-
mined that Dead Sea's removal in the case under 28 U.S.C. § 1441(d) was
improper, and as a result, the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction
over the action.51 The court vacated its forum non conveniens ruling and
remanded the case to state court. 52
Other pending actions will likely be remanded if removals were
granted on erroneous grounds now clarified by the U.S. Supreme Court.
Whether plaintiffs in civil cases already dismissed in their entirety could
refile their actions or have them reinstated on the basis of Dole v. Patrick-
son may depend on the facts and circumstances of the particular case. 53
Perhaps the patent unfairness in denying the dismissed claimants of the
benefits of the holding in Patrickson will prevail. The interests of justice
warrant affording the same treatment for those claimants. 54
47. Id. at 1663 (citing Verlinden B.V. v. Central Bank of Nigeria, 461 U.S. 480, 486
(1983)); see also Lawrence Newman and David Zaslowsky, International Litiga-
tion: High Court Narrows Coverage of FSIA, N.Y.L.J. 3, June 9, 2003.
48. Borja v. Dole Food Co., Inc., 2003 WL 21529297 (N.D. Tex. June 30, 2003).
49. Id. at *1.
50. Id.; see also In re Benjamin Moore & Co., 318 F.3d 626, 629 (5th Cir. 2002).
51. Borja, 2003 WL 21529297 at *2.
52. Id.
53. White and Case LLP, supra note 4.
54. Gondeck v. Pan American World Airways, Inc., 382 U.S. 25 (1965).
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More significantly, the Supreme Court's ruling in Dole v. Patrickson
has broader ranging effects on litigation involving foreign entities. A
finding of foreign state status has highly significant consequences for both
the entity in question and the litigant suing it. A major consequence of
foreign state status is removal rights. Federal courts are courts of limited
jurisdiction, requiring constitutional and congressional authority, such as
those under FSIA, to hear cases. 55 Underlying claims can be removed
without consent of codefendants. 56 If an entity is a foreign state, it is
immune from suit unless an exception applies. 57
Many scholars believe that litigation in federal court is advantageous to
corporate defendants, particularly for corporate defendants facing alien
tort plaintiffs seeking redress for overseas conduct. 58 A claimant has no
right to a jury trial against any entity that qualifies as a foreign state.59
Federal courts may be more encumbered by procedural constraints than
state courts, making litigation more difficult for foreign plaintiffs. 60
These constraints include stricter standing requirements, stricter burdens
of proof, restrictions on post-judgment attachments in executions, and a
more liberal standard for forum non conveniens dismissal.6 1 A forum
non conveniens dismissal that forces plaintiffs to seek redress in the
courts of law of their own countries generally equates to a victory for a
corporate defendant because it forces plaintiffs to seek recovery in for-
eign courts where there is often inadequate redress for personal injury.62
Some commentators feel that the Supreme Court decision will require
foreign states to alter the structure of instrumentalities if they desire the
legal protections of the FSIA. 63 A decision to privatize a state-owned
business will require the foreign state to consider the loss of legal protec-
tions afforded by the FSIA.64 Alternatively, a state can nationalize or
become majority owner of a corporate entity to provide FSIA protection
for civil actions not yet filed. 65
Some litigators believe that foreign countries that have used multi-
tiered subsidiaries to organize their state owned enterprises will now be
55. Mulligan, supra note 35, at 2436.
56. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(d) (2003).
57. 28 U.S.C. § 1605 (2003); see also William C. Hoffman, The Separate Entity Rule in
International Perspective: Should State Ownership of Corporate Shares Confer For-
eign Status for Immunity Purposes?, 65 TUL. L. REv. 535, 576 (1991) (most fre-
quently invoked exception requires that the plaintiff's claim must arise from a
"icommercial activity carried on in the United States ... in connection with a com-
mercial activity of the foreign state elsewhere ... and that act causes a direct affect
in the United States").
58. Mulligan, supra note 35, at 2409.
59. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(d)(2003).
60. Armin Rosencranz and Richard Campbell, Foreign Environmental and Human
Rights Suits Against U.S. Corporations in U.S. Courts, 18 STAN. ENVTL. L. 145,
188 (1999).
61. Mulligan, supra note 35, at 2409.
62. Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 506-07 (1947).
63. White and Case L.L.P., supra note 4, at 2.
64. Id.
65. Id.
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exposed to tort suits in the most pro-plaintiff state courts.66 Before the
Patrickson decision "even if a foreign company's tie to its government
was as thin as the last hair on your head, corporate defendants would get
their case tried in the more lenient, jury free federal court-and emerge
relatively unscathed. '67 "The availability of the more favorable forums
will inevitably increase the number of lawsuits against state owned enter-
prises overall. '68 One commentator on the Supreme Court decision,
Anthony Vale of Pepper Hamilton L.L.P., in Philadelphia explained that
"newly privatized companies in Europe and Asia will be exposed to law-
suits in the United States for which they once had sovereign immunity,
because the Supreme Court held that the status of the company at the
time of the alleged wrongful conduct was irrelevant. '69
According to Christian Hartley, who co-wrote the briefs for the foreign
workers in Patrickson, "the case will force corporations with ownership
remotely tied to foreign governments to behave more responsibly when
doing business in the United States."'70 Others feel that the decision lim-
its the reach of foreign state immunity and that many plaintiffs previously
denied their day in court will now have access to the judicial system. As
to the Patrickson plaintiffs, "at least some of those workers now have a
chance for justice."' 71
66. ANDREWS Toxic REP., supra note 15, at 3 (quoting Donald Falk, appellate partner
with Mayer, Brown, Rowe, and Maw).
67. Quick, supra note 36, at 2.
68. ANDREWS Toxic REP., supra note 15, at 3.
69. Id.
70. Quick, supra note 36, at 1.
71. Id.
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